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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEW MEXICO FOLLOWING
BARTLETT V. MIRABAL
CHRISTOPHER DAVID LEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the Celotex trilogy' of decisions and2
established a new approach to summary judgment procedure in the federal courts.
In 2000, the New Mexico Court of Appeals declined to adopt this approach in
Bartlett v. Mirabal.3 The Bartlett decision followed a two-part analysis of the
relationship between summary judgment procedure in New Mexico and the federal
courts. First, the Bartlett court examined whether New Mexico courts had already
adopted the federal standard.4 Concluding that New Mexico had not adopted the
Celotex approach to summary judgment, the Bartlettcourt proceeded to consider the
question of whether New Mexico should adopt the Celotex approach.5 The Bartlett
court ultimately concluded that policy considerations favored retaining New
Mexico's "traditional" approach to summary judgment over adopting the standard
articulated for the federal courts in the Celotex trilogy.6 Judge Alarid, specially
concurring in Bartlett, found, however, that New Mexico courts had exhibited a
tendency to treat the New Mexico and federal summary judgment standards as
interchangeable7 and suggested that New Mexico would benefit from the adoption
of the Celotex standard.8
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bartletton April 20, 2000,'
presumably to clarify the standard for summary judgment in New Mexico, but
following a full briefing and oral argument, the court quashed certiorari on February
22,2001.1° This proved unfortunate for summary judgment practice in New Mexico,
because the summary judgment standard found in Bartlett is vague to the point of
being difficult to apply and, in fact, appears to be a departure from New Mexico
precedent in its hostility to summary judgment practice.
This note evaluates the status of summary judgment in New Mexico following
Bartlettv. Mirabal.It begins with a statement of the case discussing the issues, both
factual and procedural, that brought Bartlett before the New Mexico Court of
Appeals. The next section focuses on the historical background leading to the
Bartlett decision. In particular, it examines the dramatic changes to summary

* Class of 2004, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank my faculty advisor,
Professor Ted Occhialino, for his invaluable guidance and encouragement on this project.
1. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
2. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139
F.R.D. 441,451 (1991) ("This trilogy of cases clarified the summary judgment procedure and increased its utility.").
3. 2000-NMCA-036, 1 39, 999 P.2d 1062, 1070.
4. See id. 35-39, 999 P.2d at 1069-70.
5. Id. 1 25, 999 P.2d at 1067.
6. Id. 139, 999 P.2d at 1070.
7. Id. 1 41, 999 P.2d at 1070 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
8. Id. H 47-48, 999 P.2d at 1071-72 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
9. Bartlett v. Mirabal, 2000-NMCA-036, 999 P.2d 1062, cert. granted, 129 N.M. 208, 4 P.3d 36 (Apr. 20,
2000).
10. Bartlett v. Mirabal, 2000-NMCA-036, 999 P.2d 1062, cert. quashed, 130 N.M. 154, 20 P.3d 811 (Feb.
22, 2001).
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judgment practice in the federal courts that followed in the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions in the Celotex trilogy. The next section develops the
rationale of the Bartlett decision, focusing especially on the arguments and use of
precedent that the majority and special concurrence employ in reaching their
divergent conclusions regarding the two issues before the Bartlettcourt. The Bartlett
decision then is analyzed in terms of how the court ruled with respect to each of the
four Celotex summary judgment principles. This analysis develops the contours of
summary judgment in New Mexico in relation to the federal standard. The final
section discusses the implications of the Bartlett decision on summary judgment
practice in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bartlett v. Mirabal arose from an interlocutory appeal from a will contest." Gia
May Bartlett (Petitioner) filed the will of Silvestre Mirabal (Decedent) for formal
3
probate.' 2 The will provided that Decedent's entire estate would go to Petitioner.
Decedent's sister, Maria Mirabal (Contestant), challenged the will on various
grounds, including undue influence. 14
Petitioner moved for summary judgment. 5 Contestant responded to Petitioner's
motion for summary judgment with evidence "intended to show that Petitioner had
a confidential relationship with Decedent and that suspicious circumstances
surrounded the execution of his last two wills.' 6 Contestant argued that these
suspicious circumstances included the unnatural and unjust distribution of the estate,
the lack of consideration for the transfer to Petitioner, the Petitioner's participation
in the procurement of the will, and the abuse of a confidential relationship.'
Contestant further argued that the Decedent's age and frail health, his susceptibility
to undue influence, and Petitioner's isolation of Decedent from his family
constituted additional suspicious circumstances. 8 At the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment, Contestant abandoned all her grounds for contesting the will
except undue influence.' 9
The evidentiary burden of proof at trial on the claim of undue influence would
have been clear and convincing, as opposed to preponderance of the evidence. 2° In
ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court indicated in its order that
confusion existed regarding whether it should apply the clear and convincing
standard or the preponderance standard at the summary judgment stage:
If the burden of proof at summary judgment proceedings were in fact "clear and
convincing evidence", as held by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed.2d 202 (1986),
11. 2000-NMCA-036, 1,999 P.2d at 1063.
12. Id. See Rule 1-056 NMRA 2003.
13. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 2, 999 P.2d at1063.
14. Id. 1 1, 999 P.2d at 1063.
15. Id.; Rule 1-056 NMRA 2003.
16. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 2,999 P.2d at 1063.
17.

Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
1 1,999 P.2d at 1063.
20. Id.
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and further suggested by Justice Ransom in Eoff v. Forrest,109 N.M. 695, 789
P.2d 1262 (1990), the Court would have granted [Petitioner's] Motion for
Summary Judgment and dismissed the case.2'
The trial court implicitly adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard for
the purpose of ruling on Petitioner's motion for summary judgment, even though the
burden of proof at trial on the issue of undue influence would have been clear and
convincing evidence. 2 The trial court denied Petitioner's motion for summary
judgment but granted Petitioner an interlocutory appeal of that order.23
On appeal, Petitioner argued that the evidentiary standard of proof by clear and
convincing evidence should have been applied by the trial court during the summary
judgment stage when it was determining whether genuine issues of material fact
existed regarding Contestant's claim of undue influence. 24 The court of appeals
ultimately affirmed the order of the trial court, however, and denied Petitioner's
motion for summary judgment for reasons that will be discussed below.25
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Celotex Approach to Summary Judgment
The three decisions comprising the Celotex trilogy, MatsushitaElectric Industry
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,26 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,27 and Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett,28 collectively codified a new approach to summary judgment in the
federal courts. Prior to the Celotex trilogy, summary judgment was viewed by many
courts as unduly difficult to obtain.29 One commentator has suggested that, prior to
the Celotex decisions, the Supreme Court was sending "mixed messages about the
availability of the motion. ' 30 The Court, however, adopted a position in the Celotex
trilogy that made summary judgment more readily available in the federal courts and
established a doctrine favoring the use of summary judgment as a method of
controlling case management and resolution. 3 The Court gave the following
expression to this new approach to summary judgment: "Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as
an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' ' 32 In addition to
providing rhetorical support for the use of summary judgment, in appropriate cases,
to manage overburdened court dockets, the Celotex decisions increased the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. 3, 999 P.2d at 1063.
Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 3, 999 P.2d at 1063.
Id.
Id. 1, 999 P.2d at 1063.
Id.
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
477 U.S. 242 (1986).
477 U.S. 317 (1986).
11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
Id.
Id. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).

56.03 (3d ed. 2002).
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availability of summary judgment to litigants by reinterpreting the principles that
trial court judges apply in the summary judgment process.
Four new principles regarding summary judgment arose from the various
holdings of the Celotex cases. The first principle, addressed in Liberty Lobby, is that
the substantive burden of proof required at trial is to be applied at the summary
judgment stage.33 The second principle, also found in Liberty Lobby, is that the test
for summary judgment mirrors the test for directed verdict, the difference between
summary judgment and directed verdict being their timing in the litigation.34 The
third principle, articulated in Celotex, is one of organization. It provides the structure
for summary judgment by establishing what is required of a moving party in order
to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment and by
articulating the mechanics of burden shifting that takes place following a successful
prima facie showing. 35 Finally, the fourth principle, articulated in Celotex, 6 and
discernible in Matsushita,3 7 is that summary judgment procedure is not a disfavored
shortcut, but rather an integral part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
are designed to secure the just and efficient determination of every action.38 What
follows is a detailed presentation of these four summary judgment principles, each
of which is discussed by way of its origin in the Celotex trilogy.
1. First Principle: Substantive EvidentiaryBurden Applies at the Summary
Judgment Stage
The Liberty Lobby Court held that the substantive evidentiary standard of proof
that would apply at the trial on the merits applies at the summary judgment stage.39
In Liberty Lobby, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether, in a cause of
action requiring clear and convincing evidence at trial, the heightened evidentiary
standard must be taken into account by a court ruling on a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4°
Liberty Lobby arose in the context of a defamation suit.4 In order to sustain the
claim of defamation, the plaintiffs had to prove actual malice in the publication of
the allegedly defamatory statement by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by
a preponderance of the evidence.42 The Court reasoned that "the 'genuine issue'
summary judgment standard is 'very close' to the 'reasonable jury' directed verdict
33. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
34. Id. at 251.
35. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 329-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 327.
37. Compare Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,587 (1986) (finding that party
defending against summary judgment in a large antitrust action must come forward with more persuasive evidence
to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary when their claim is economically implausible) with
Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256 (1948) (suggesting that summary judgment is seldom available in
large or complicated cases).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1;11MOORE ET AL., supra note 29.
39. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
40. Id. at 244. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The Court noted that its analysis in Liberty Lobby did not address the
question of the initial burden of production of evidence-the prima facie showing-required by the party moving
for summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250 n.4. The Court instead referred the reader to the Celotex case
on this issue. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).
41. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 244-45.
42. Id. at 245 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
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standard."4 3 The Court concluded that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion
for summary judgment necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard
of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits" because the standard for
summary judgment mirrors that for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a).45 The Court consequently held that the substantive evidentiary
standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits applies at the summary
judgment stage. 6
The holding in Liberty Lobby. was not confined to First Amendment cases, but
rather altered summary judgment for all litigants, regardless of the nature of the
litigation.4 7 In its holding, the Court referred not just to summary judgment in
defamation cases, but rather to summary judgment generally: "Thus, in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through
the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. 48
The Court reasoned that the substantive evidentiary standard is applied to
determine whether there are genuine issues that properly can be resolved only by a
finder of fact because these issues could reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party. 49 This is necessary because "[i]t makes no sense to say that a jury could
reasonably find for either party without some benchmark as to what standards
govern its deliberations and within what boundaries its ultimate decision must
fall., 50 Thus, the application of the substantive evidentiary standard at the summary
judgment stage functions as a threshold inquiry into whether there is a need for a
trial on the merits.5

43. Id. at 251 (quoting Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.lI (1983)).
44. Id. at 252.
45. Id. at 250.
46. Id. at 252.
47. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 258 n. I (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tloday's decision by its terms applies
to all summary judgment motions, irrespective of the burden of proof required and the subject matter of the suit.").
48. Id. at 254. See also id. at 258 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holding today is not, of course,
confined in its application to First Amendment cases.").
49. Id. at 250.
50. Id. at 254-55. The Court does, however, separate the incorporation of the evidentiary standard into the
summary judgment determination from the inquiry into whether issues exist regarding any material facts. Id. at 24748. The substantive evidentiary burden applies to the genuine issue question of the summary judgment
determination, whereas materiality is "a criterion for categorizing factual disputes in their relation to the legal
elements of the claim and not a criterion for evaluating the evidentiary underpinnings of those disputes." Id. at 248,
254-55. The materiality determination rests on substantive law, which identifies what facts are critical and what
facts are irrelevant. Id. at 248. Consequently, the evidentiary requirements embodied in the first principle are not
relevant to the inquiry regarding which facts are material to which elements of the claim. The third Celotex summary
judgment principle, however, implicates the materiality of the facts to the elements of the claim by its requirement
that the party contesting summary judgment provide evidence regarding each essential element of his claim. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) ("The moving party is 'entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law'
because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with
respect to which she has the burden of proof.").
5I. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250.
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2. Second Principle: The Testfor Summary Judgment Mirrors the Test for
Directed Verdict
The second principle also arose from the Liberty Lobby decision. It is that the test
for summary judgment mirrors the test for directed verdict.52 The Court, in Liberty
Lobby, took a number of steps in developing this principle.
The Court first provided two formulations of the standard for directed verdict,
one affirmative and one negative. The first formulation was that a trial judge must
direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there could be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.53 The second formulation was that if reasonable minds can
differ in their respective interpretations of the evidence, a verdict should not be
directed.54 Based upon these formulations, the Court reasoned that the issue for a
judge ruling on a motion for directed verdict is not whether there is a scintilla of
evidence supporting the non-moving party's case, but whether there is any evidence
upon which a jury could properly reach a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.55
The Court encapsulated this reasoning as the "reasonable jury" directed verdict
test.56
The Court next articulated the standard for summary judgment. The standard,
taken directly from the language of Rule 56, is that a trial judge shall grant summary
judgment "if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."57 The Court reasoned that "summary
judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. 58 The Court referred to this as the "genuine issue" summary judgment test.59
The Court, in Liberty Lobby, proceeded to compare the "reasonable jury"
directed verdict test with the "genuine issue" summary judgment test. The Court set
the ground for the comparison by citing its reasoning in Sartor v. Arkansas Gas
Corp.' that summary judgment should only be granted where the evidence is such
that it would require a directed verdict in favor of the moving party. 6' The Court
then described how the "genuine issue" summary judgment test closely mirrors the
"reasonable jury" directed verdict test: "In essence, though, the inquiry under each
is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law. '62 The Court concluded that the difference between the two motions
is procedural: summary judgment motions are generally made before trial and
decided on documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are made at trial
52. Id. at 251.
53. Id. at 250 (citing Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943)).
54. Id. (citing Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 62 (1949)).
55. Id. at 251 (citing Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448, 20 L. Ed. 867 (1872)).
56. See id.
57. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
58. Id. at 248. But see id. at 258-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("No direct authority is cited for the proposition
that in order to determine whether a dispute is 'genuine' for Rule 56 purposes ajudge must ask if a 'reasonable' jury
could find for the non-moving party.").
59. Id. at 251.
60. 321 U.S. 620, 624 (1944).
61. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251.
62. Id. at 251-52.
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and decided on the evidence that has been admitted.63 Despite this difference in
timing, the Court found that the inquiry involved in both motions is the same:
whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party on the
evidence presented.'
In order for the trial judge to undertake this inquiry, there must exist some criteria
by which she can evaluate what evidence would allow the jury to find for either the
plaintiff or the defendant.65 The Court reasoned that these criteria are embodied in
the applicable substantive evidentiary standard, which serves as the required
benchmark.66 The Court concluded that trial judges, in applying this benchmark to
motions for summary judgment and directed verdict, must therefore examine the
evidence in light of the substantive evidentiary burden.67
The question then arose, how is the test for summary judgment to be applied? Or,
in the words of Justice Brennan writing in dissent to Liberty Lobby, "how does a
judge assess how one-sided evidence is, or what a 'fair-minded' jury could
'reasonably' decide?"68 The Court held in Liberty Lobby that the trial judge is not
to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter. 69 Rather, the trial judge
is merely supposed to evaluate whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in that party's favor, i.e.,
whether there exists a genuine issue for trial. 7' Therefore, the Court concluded that
the trial judge must limit herself, in ruling on motions for summary judgment and
directed verdict, to an evaluation of the caliber and quantity of evidence in light of
the substantive evidentiary standard. 7'
3. Third Principle: The PrimaFacie Showing and Burden Shifting
The third principle to arise from the Celotex trilogy was an organizing principle
that established the structure for summary judgment. This principle governs the
initial burden of production borne by the party moving for summary judgment and
determines as well the structure of burden shifting that follows a successful prima
facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment. Justice Brennan's discussion of
summary judgment in Celotex, though technically in dissent, is likely the best
available articulation of the third principle. His discussion meticulously detailed the
mechanics of burden shifting, as well as the requirements for establishing a prima
facie case for summary judgment.72

63. Id. at 251.
64. Id. at 252.
65. Id. at 254.
66. Id.
67. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254. This is the first summary judgment principle, discussed in the text supra,
that the substantive evidentiary burden of proof applies at the summary judgment stage.
68. Id. at 265 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 249.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 254. Justice Brennan argued that this procedure necessarily involves weighing the evidence. Id.
at 266-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He thus speculated that the Liberty Lobby decision would "transform what is
meant to provide an expedited 'summary' procedure into a full-blown paper trial on the merits." Id.
72. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 329-37 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
reckoned that his analysis of summary judgment was only technically in dissent: "I do not read the Court's opinion
to say anything inconsistent with or different than the preceding discussion [of summary judgment]. My
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Justice Brennan first noted that summary judgment is appropriate when the court
has been shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 73 The burden of
establishing that there exists no "genuine issue" is on the party moving for summary
judgment. 74 This burden has two distinct components: the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion.75
The initial burden of production requires the moving party to make a prima facie
showing that it is entitled to summary judgment.76 If the moving party successfully
makes this prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving
party. 77 As Justice Brennan stated,
The burden of persuasion imposed on a moving party by Rule 56 is a stringent
one. Summary judgment should not be granted unless it is clear that a trial is
unnecessary, and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial should
be resolved against the moving party'7 .

A trial court need not entertain, however, whether the moving party has met its
ultimate burden of persuasion "unless and until the
Court finds that the moving party
79
production.,
of
burden
initial
its
discharged
has
A threshold question in the summary judgment process regards whether the party
seeking summary judgment will bear the burden of persuasion at trial.8° This
question is significant because the manner in which the prima facie showing can be
made is greatly affected by whether the moving party will bear the burden of
persuasion on the challenged claim at trial. The most common scenario is when the
party moving for summary judgment does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial,
typically where the defendant seeks summary judgment. The less common scenario
is when the party moving for summary judgment does bear the burden of persuasion
at trial, as occurs when the plaintiff moves for summary judgment or when the
defendant moves for summary judgment on a counterclaim or based on an
affirmative defense.
a. The party moving for summary judgment will bear the
burden of persuasion at trial.
The first scenario is when the party moving for summary judgment is the party
that will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, as when the plaintiff moves for
summary judgment. In order to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to
summary judgment, the moving party must submit credible evidence of a quality

disagreement with the Court concerns the application of these principles to the facts of this case." Id. at 334.
Nowhere in the Celotex opinion does the Court disavow this statement. Presumably then, one can look to Justice
Brennan's extraordinarily well-reasoned analysis of summary judgment for a valid statement of the third Celotex
summary judgment principle.
73. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
74. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 331 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 330-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and quantity that would entitle it to a directed verdict were that evidence not
controverted at trial." Under the test for a directed verdict, the moving party would
be required to provide evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that there could
be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict-in this case, in favor of the
moving party.8 2 The evidence that the moving party can submit in support of its
motion for summary judgment includes pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, as well as affidavits.83
Following a successful prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to
the non-moving party.84 The non-moving party can then resist the prima facie
showing and defeat the motion for summary judgment in one of two ways: by
producing evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence of a "genuine issue"
for trial or by submitting an affidavit requesting additional time for discovery.85 The
non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the moving
party's evidence but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a "genuine
issue" for trial.86 If the non-moving party does not respond in one of these two
manners, after a successful prima facie showing by the moving party, summary
judgment shall be entered against the non-moving party.87
b. The party moving for summary judgment does not bear the
burden of persuasion at trial.
The second scenario is when the party moving for summary judgment does not
bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Typically, this is the scenario where the
defendant seeks summary judgment. According to Justice Brennan, if the party
moving for summary judgment does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the
moving party may make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment
in one of two ways: it may submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential
element of the non-moving party's claim or it may demonstrate to the court that the
non-moving party's evidence
is insufficient to establish an essential element of the
88
non-moving party's claim.
(1) First method-negate an essential element
Under the first method, the moving party submits evidence to negate an essential
element of the non-moving party's claim. 89 If the moving party successfully makes
a prima facie showing by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an essential
element of the non-moving party's claim, the burden of production then shifts to the

81. Under the test for a directed verdict, the moving party would be required to provide evidence sufficient
to convince the trial judge that there could be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. at 250 (citing Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943)).
82. Id. (citing Brady, 320 U.S. at 479-80).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
85. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), (f).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
87. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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non-moving party.9" The non-moving party must then undertake one of the
following in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment: (1) rehabilitate the
evidence attacked in the moving party's motion, (2) produce additional evidence
showing the existence of a "genuine issue" for trial, or (3) submit an affidavit
explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).9 Summary
judgment should be granted if the non-moving party fails to respond in one or more
of these ways.9 2 The court can also grant summary judgment if, after the nonmoving party has responded, the court determines that "the moving party has met
its ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of material
fact for trial."93
(2) Second method-point to the insufficiency of the non-moving party's
evidence
The moving party can also make its prima facie showing by demonstrating to the
court that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential
element of its claim.94 As Justice Brennan noted, when a party employs this second
method, "the mechanics of discharging Rule 56's burden of production are
somewhat trickier. Plainly, a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no
evidence is insufficient."95 Instead, when the moving party asserts that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support its claim, the moving party must
affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record.96 This may require that the
moving party demonstrate this absence by "reviewing for the court the admissions,
interrogatories, and other exchanges between the parties that are in the record."9 7
Where some evidence is in the record, the moving party can point out the
insufficiency of the non-moving party's evidence on an essential element by
deposing the non-moving party's witnesses or by establishing the inadequacy of
documentary evidence.9 8 In one way or another, however, the moving party must
make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment by affirmatively
demonstrating that there is no evidence in the record that would support a judgment
for the non-moving party. 99
If the moving party fails to make a prima facie showing because it is unsuccessful
in demonstrating to the trial court that the non-moving party's evidence is
insufficient to establish an essential element of their claim, its motion for summary
judgment must be denied and the trial court need not consider whether the moving

90. Id. at 333 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(f).
92. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 333 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also id.at 328 (White, J.,
concurring) ("It is not enough to move
for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the [nonmoving party] has no evidence to prove his case.").
96. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. See id.
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party met its ultimate burden of persuasion.'0o If the moving party, however, does
make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment based on the
absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claim, the burden of
production then shifts to the non-moving party.'
The non-moving party can contest the assertion that it has no evidence to support
its claim "by calling the Court's attention to supporting evidence already in the
record that was previously overlooked or ignored by the moving party."'0 2 For
example, the non-moving party might call attention to a witness overlooked by the
moving party who will provide relevant testimony for the non-moving party at
trial. °3In that event, the burden of production shifts back to the moving party, who
then must respond by demonstrating the inadequacy of the evidence that had
previously been overlooked or ignored."
The non-moving party can also contest the assertion that it has no evidence to
support an essential element of its claim by producing additional evidence showing
the existence of a "genuine issue" for trial0 5 or by submitting an affidavit explaining
why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f). "
4. Fourth Principle: Summary Judgment Is No Longer a Disfavored Procedural Shortcut
The fourth principle to arise from the Celotex trilogy was that summary judgment
procedure is not a disfavored procedural shortcut but rather an integral part of the
Federal Rules. 7 This principle is primarily articulated in the Celotex decision,
though its contours are discernible in the Matsushita opinion.0 8 Traditionally,
summary judgment was treated in the federal courts with disapprobation and
therefore had been rather unduly difficult to obtain," but the Supreme Court, in the
Celotex trilogy, established summary judgment as an appropriate source of power
for federal judges to control litigation and manage overburdened dockets. " 0 In
particular, Celotex suggested that, following the shift to notice pleading accomplished by the Federal Rules in 1938, summary judgment is the principal tool used
to terminate factually insufficient claims or defenses before they can go to trial and
needlessly tax public and private resources."' Following the Celotex decisions,
summary judgment is now a favored procedural tool for judges to control their

100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 332-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 333 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. See FED. R.Civ. P.56(f). These two strategies for defending against summaryjudgment are described
supra in the text with regard to the scenario where the moving party has attempted to negate an essential element
of the non-moving party's claim. See section ill(A)(3)(b).
107. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1; 11 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29.
108. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 599 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting)
("[L]anguage in the Court's opinion suggests a departure from traditional summary judgment doctrine.").
109.

11 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29.

110. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
111. See id.
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dockets and thus give effect to Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
promotes the just and efficient determination of every action under the rules."'
IV. RATIONALE
Bartlett arose from an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of the
petitioner's motion for summary judgment." 3 An appeal from a denial of summary
judgment presents a question of law and is consequently reviewed de novo." 4 The
Bartlett court was presented with two main issues on appeal. The first issue before
the Bartlett court was whether New Mexico already had adopted the federal
approach to summary judgment." 5 The second issue was whether the federal
approach to summary judgment should be adopted as law in New Mexico, if it had
not already been incorporated into New Mexico law." 6
A. Has New Mexico Already Adopted the FederalApproach to Summary
Judgment?
1. The Bartlett Majority
The first issue considered by the Bartlett majority was whether New Mexico
previously had adopted the federal approach to summary judgment." 7 The majority
began its discussion by noting that the New Mexico state judiciary determines the
interpretation to give its rules of civil procedure and is not bound by the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of summary judgment in Liberty Lobby." 8 The
majority divided its analysis of the first issue into three parts. The first part
addressed the Petitioner's contention that the substantive evidentiary burden of
proof at trial should apply at the summary judgment stage because a motion for
summary judgment was analogous to a motion for directed verdict," 9 which had
been held to implicate the substantive evidentiary burden. 20 In the second part, the
Bartlett court discussed those New Mexico decisions that had cited the federal
summary judgment standard from the Celotex trilogy of cases.' 2' The final part
focused on three particular cases relied upon by Petitioner to support her contention
that New Mexico previously had adopted the federal summary judgment standard. 22
'
The Bartlett majority first addressed Petitioner's contention that the substantive
evidentiary burden of proof that would be required at the trial on the merits should
apply at the summary judgment stage.' 23 The Petitioner argued that a motion for
summary judgment was analogous to a motion for directed verdict and, therefore,

112. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Bartlett v. Mirabal, 2000-NMCA-036, 91,999 P.2d 1062, 1063.
Id. 44, 999 P.2d at 1063 (citing Harrell v. Hayes, 1998-NMCA-122, 11,965 P.2d 933, 936).
Id. 8, 999 P.2d at 1064.
Id. 25, 999 P.2d at 1067.
Id. 8,999 P.2d at 1064.
Id. 915, 999 P.2d at 1063-64.
See Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 9 5-16, 999 P.2d at 1063-65.
Chavez v. Manville Prod. Corp., 108 N.M. 643, 648, 777 P.2d 371, 376 (N.M. 1989).
See Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, n 9-16, 999 P.2d at 1064-65.
Id. (1 18-24, 999 P.2d at 1066-67.
Id.
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the same evidentiary considerations applied to both. 124 The Bartlett majority
reasoned that the New Mexico approach differed from the federal approach because
the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Eoff v. Forrest,clearly distinguished between
a motion for summary judgment and a motion for directed verdict.125 Therefore, the
Bartlett majority held that the test for summary judgment was not analogous to the
test for directed verdict under New Mexico law126 and, consequently, the substantive
evidentiary burden of proof, though applied2 at
the directed verdict stage, was not to
7
be applied at the summary judgment stage.
The Bartlett majority next examined six of the seven 28 reported New Mexico
appellate decisions that, at the time of Bartlett, had cited either Liberty Lobby or
Celotex. 129 Three of the six decisions had issued from the New Mexico Court of
Appeals: Furgason v. Clausen,3 ' Blauwkamp v. University of New Mexico
Hospital,'3 ' and Wolford v. Lasater.132 The other three had been decided by the New
Mexico Supreme Court: Paca v. K-Mart
Corp.,33 Peck v. Title USA Insurance
35
134
Co.
Corp., and Goradiav. Hahn
The majority reasoned that the first two cases, Blauwkamp and Furgason, were
inapposite to the contention that New Mexico courts had tended to equate the New
Mexico and federal summary judgment standards. 136 The Bartlettmajority reasoned
that Blauwkamp represented a legal coincidence rather than a move toward the
adoption of the federal standard. 137 Furgason, which cited Liberty Lobby for the
following proposition: "A motion for summary judgment in a defamation action
necessarily involves determination of the substantive evidentiary standard of proof
that would apply at a trial on the merits," was also determined to be not
controlling. 38 The Bartlett majority next distinguished Wolford, where the New

124. Id.
125. Id. 7,999 P.2d at 1064 (citing Eoffv. Forrest, 109 N.M. 695, 701,789 P.2d 1262, 1268 (N.M. 1990)).
126. Id. See Chavez v. Manville Prod. Corp., 108 N.M. 643, 648, 777 P.2d 371, 376 (N.M. 1989).
127. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 7, 999 P.2d at 1064 (citing Eoff, 109 N.M. at 701, 789 P.2d at 1268).
128. The seventh reported New Mexico decision that cited the federal summary judgment standard was Eoff,
109 N.M. 695, 789 P.2d 1262. Justice Ransom, specially concurring in Eoff, cited Liberty Lobby for the principle
that the substantive evidentiary standard of proof should apply to the summary judgment stage. Id. at 702, 789 P.2d
at 1269 (Ransom, J., specially concurring) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255 (1986)).
It is not clear why the Bartlett majority omitted Eofffrom its discussion of the reported New Mexico decisions that
had cited cases from the Celotex trilogy for the federal summary judgment standard. In any case, the majority gave
considerable attention to Eoff in that part of its analysis where it inquired whether New Mexico had previously
adopted the Liberty Lobby approach to summary judgment. See Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, WJ17-24, 999 P.2d at
1065-67.
129. The Bartlett court did not mention Matsushita in its discussion of the federal summary judgment
standard.
130. 109 N.M. 331, 785 P.2d 242 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
131. 114 N.M. 228, 836 P.2d 1249 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
132. 1999-NMCA-024, 973 P.2d 866.
133. 108 N.M. 479, 775 P.2d 245 (N.M. 1989).
134. 108 N.M. 30, 766 P.2d 290 (N.M. 1988).
135. 111 N.M. 779, 810 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1991).
136. Bartlett v. Mirabal, 2000-NMCA-036, 9, 999 P.2d 1062, 1064.
137. What made Blauwkamp inapposite, according to the Bartlett majority, was that, on the facts of that case,
Celotex and existing New Mexico cases produced the same result. Id. 10, 999 P.2d at 1064 (citing Blauwkamp
v. Univ. of N.M. Hosp., 114 N.M. 228, 232, 836 P.2d 1249, 1253 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)).
138. Furgason v. Clausen, 109 N.M. 331, 339, 785 P.2d 242, 250 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)). The Bartlett majority concluded that the application of the substantive
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Mexico Court of Appeals had stated, "the federal and our own state's constructions
of summary judgment do not differ substantively."' 39 The Bartlett majority
continued with a discussion of Peck v. Title USA InsuranceCorp. 40 and Paca v. KMart Corp. ' and concluded that the language from Celotex was utilized in those
New Mexico cases merely for its boilerplate language on summary judgment
standards.'42 Finally, the Bartlett majority distinguished Goradia on the facts and
concluded that Goradia also cited Liberty Lobby for its boilerplate summary
judgment language.' 43
The Bartlett majority's examination of the relevant New Mexico case law
ultimately led it to the conclusion that New Mexico appellate decisions that had
cited Liberty Lobby or Celotex for the federal summary judgment standard did so
merely for the boilerplate language.'" Therefore, the Bartlett majority found that
New Mexico precedent did not support the proposition that New Mexico courts had
adopted the Liberty Lobby approach to summary judgment. 4' 5
46
The final part of the majority's analysis discussed three cases, Melnick,
Chavez,'47 and Eoff,'4 8 which were relied upon by the petitioner in Bartlett to support
her contention that New Mexico had previously adopted the federal summary
judgment standard. 149 The Bartlett majority initially noted that these decisions, with
the exception of Justice Ransom's concurrence in Eoff, did not address Liberty

evidentiary standard at the summary judgment stage in Furgasonwas not a move towards adoption of the Liberty
Lobby standard but rather was necessitated by the procedural posture of that case. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, I 11,
999 P.2d at 1064-65. Furthermore, the Bartlett majority noted that Furgason relied in its discussion of summary
judgment on an old New Mexico case, Mahona-Jojanto,Inc. v. Bank of N.M., 79 N.M. 293, 442 P.2d 783 (N.M.
1968), which was "steeped in the traditional approach to summary judgment." Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 12,999
P.2d at 1065.
139. Wolford v. Lasater, 1999-NMCA-024, 1 11,973 P.2d 866, 869. The Bartlett majority drew on the
specific language of the quote from Wolford to show why that case did not represent an adoption of the Liberty
Lobby approach to summary judgment. Specifically, the majority pointed out that the Wolford court declined to go
so far as to hold that the two standards were identical. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 13,999 P.2d at 1065. Therefore,
the majority concluded, Wolford suggested that some difference between the two standards did in fact exist: "the
[Wolford] opinion clearly recognized that the standards were different, as we note in this opinion." Id. (quoting
Wolford, 1999-NMCA-024, 11, 973 P.2d at 869) (citation omitted).
140. 108 N.M. 30, 766 P.2d 290 (N.M. 1988).
141. 108 N.M. 479, 775 P.2d 245 (N.M. 1989).
142. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 14, 999 P.2d at 1065.
143. Id. ([ 14-15, 999 P.2d at 1065. Goradia variously cited Celotex and Liberty Lobby for five different
propositions related to summary judgment. The Bartlett majority argued that Goradia, despite its numerous citations
to Celotex and Liberty Lobby, did not evince a movement towards adoption of the federal summary judgment
standard in New Mexico because it involved a "unique situation...where no facts were in dispute." Id. 1 15, 999
P.2d at 1065. The majority's treatment of Goradia was rather disingenuous, however, because the purportedly
"unique" situation in Goradia was hardly unique: summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of
material fact is in dispute. See Rule 1-056(c) NMRA 2003. Nonetheless, the Bartlettmajority reasoned that "because
no facts were in dispute, the [Goradia] court's determination at the summary judgment stage would be based on
the same standard as would be used at the end of trial for a directed verdict." Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 15, 999
P.2d at 1065. Therefore, the Bartlett majority concluded, Goradia "only relied on Anderson for its boilerplate
summary judgment holding, not its new approach to summary judgment." Id. 1 16, 999 P.2d at 1065.
144. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, U 14, 16, 999 P.2d at 1065.
145. Id.
146. Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 726, 749 P.2d 1105 (N.M. 1988).
147. Chavez v. Manville Prod. Corp., 108 N.M. 643, 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989).
148. Eoff v. Forrest, 109 N.M. 695, 789 P.2d 1262 (N.M. 1990).
149. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 9118-24, 999 P.2d at 1066-67.
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Lobby, even though0 the Celotex trilogy had been decided prior to all three New
5
Mexico decisions.
The petitioner in Bartlett argued that the only difference between summary
judgment and directed verdict proceedings was one of timing in the litigation.' To
support this argument, she pointed to the discussion in Melnick that compared
summary judgment with directed verdict.'5 2 The Bartlett majority rejected this
argument, reasoning that the Melnick holding did not extend to summary judgment
procedure but instead was limited to the issue of whether a trial court's reversal of
its own interlocutory ruling was reversible error.'53 The majority then turned to the
Chavez decision and concluded that the Chavez court had the opportunity to address
the claim that the only difference between summary judgment and directed verdict
was timing, but the court chose instead to carefully distinguish the two motions in
its discussion. 54
' Finally, the Bartlett majority argued that Eoff represented another
instance of when a New Mexico appellate court considered adopting the federal
approach to summary judgment but explicitly chose not to do so. 55 Based on its
reading of these three cases, the Bartlett majority concluded that there was no
evidence that New Mexico courts previously had adopted the federal approach to
summary judgment or even tended to treat the federal and state summary judgment
56
standards as interchangeable.
2. The Bartlett Special Concurrence
In his special concurrence to Bartlett,Judge Alarid argued that New Mexico cases
have tended to treat federal and state summary judgment standards as interchangeable.'5 7 Judge Alarid reached this conclusion after examining the same six New
Mexico cases that the Bartlett majority used to support its conclusion that New
Mexico courts previously had not adopted the federal summary judgment
standard. 58 Despite his view that New Mexico courts tended to treat the federal and
New Mexico summary judgment standards as interchangeable, Judge Alarid was not
convinced that New Mexico already had adopted the Celotex approach and thus he
chose to specially concur rather than to dissent because he believed that "the
adoption of Anderson or Celotex should be accomplished, if at all, by express
directive of our Supreme Court." '
The Bartlett special concurrence found that the Furgason court followed the
Liberty Lobby approach and applied the substantive evidentiary burden-in this
150. Id. 1 19, 999 P.2d at 1066.
151. Id. 20,999P.2dat 1066.
152. Id. (citing Melnick, 106 N.M. at 727, 749 P.2d at 1106).
153. Id. 20, 999 P.2d at 1066 (citing Melnick, 106 N.M. at 727, 749 P.2d at 1106).
154. Id. 22, 999 P.2d at 1066-67 (citing Chavez v. Manville Prod. Corp., 108 N.M. 643, 644-50, 777 P.2d
371, 372-78 (N.M. 1989)).
155. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 19, 999 P.2d at 1066.
156. Id. 1 25, 999 P.2d at 1067.
157. Id. 1 41, 999 P.2d at 1070 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
158. Id. The special concurrence did agree with the Bartlett majority that Paca and Peck both cited Celotex
merely for its boilerplate language regarding summary judgment. Id. 45, 999 P.2d at 1071 (Alarid, J.,
specially
concurring). Interestingly, the special concurrence, like the Bartlett majority, omitted Eoff from that part of
its
discussion that focused on the New Mexico cases that had cited Celotex or Liberty Lobby.
159. Id. 50, 999 P.2d at 1072 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
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case, clear and convincing-at the summary judgment stage. 60 Judge Alarid then
pointed to the use of Celotex in the Blauwkamp decision as support for his argument
that the New Mexico summary judgment standard was perceived as interchangeable
with the federal standard. 16 The special concurrence then invoked the plain meaning
of the following quote from Wolford: "the federal and
' 62 our own state's constructions
of summary judgment do not differ substantively."'
Judge Alarid concluded with a discussion of Goradia, in which he made his
strongest argument in favor of the proposition that New Mexico courts have tended
to treat the federal and state summary judgment standard as interchangeable. 163 In
particular, Judge Alarid focused on the fact that Goradiaarticulated a standard for
summary judgment that mirrored New Mexico's directed verdict standard."6 Judge
Alarid reasoned that the fair-minded factfinder summary judgment standard
articulated in Goradia was remarkably similar to the directed verdict standard
described by Justice Ransom's concurrence in Eoff and, therefore, Goradia
represented a significant move toward adoption of Justice Ransom's suggestion in
Eoff that the substantive evidentiary standard of proof be applied at the summary
judgment stage. 165
Based on his analysis of New Mexico cases that have cited the federal summary
judgment standard, Judge Alarid concluded that these cases suggested a tendency

160. Id. [42, 999 P.2d at 1070 (Alarid, J., specially concurring) (citing Furgason v. Clausen, 109 N.M. 331,
339, 785 P.2d 242, 250 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989)). Judge Alarid noted that Furgason cited Liberty Lobby for the
principle that a motion for summary judgment in a defamation case necessarily implicates a determination of the
substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at trial. Id. (citing Furgason, 109 N.M. at 339, 785 P.2d
at 250).
161. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036,143, 999 P.2d at 1070 (Alarid, J., specially concurring) (quoting Blauwkamp
v. Univ. of N.M. Hosp., 114 N.M. 228, 232, 836 P.2d 1249, 1253 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)). Blauwkamp held that
defendants in a medical malpractice case could make a prima facie case of entitlement to summary judgment merely
by pointing out that the plaintiff lacked an expert witness. Id. (citing Blauwkamp, 114 N.M. at 232, 836 P.2d at
1253). The Blauwkamp court cited directly to the Celotex decision for the proposition that a party moving for
summary judgment could make its prima facie showing by demonstrating to the court that the non-moving party's
evidence was insufficient to establish an element of the non-moving party's claim. Blauwkamp, 114 N.M. at 232,
836 P.2d at 1253 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
162. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 44, 999 P.2d at 1070 (Alarid, J., specially concurring) (citing Wolford v.
Lasater, 1999-NMCA-024, 1 11, 973 P.2d 866, 869). Whereas the Bartlett majority suggested that this statement
from Wolford indicated that some important, yet non-substantive, distinction between the two standards still existed,
Judge Alarid took the Wolford decision at face value to support his argument that New Mexico cases had treated
the state and federal summary judgment standards as interchangeable. Id. But see id. at 13, 999 P.2d at 1065.
163. Id. 46, 999 P.2d at 1071 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
164. Id. The Goradia court articulated the fair-minded factfinder standard for use in determining whether the
non-moving party had successfully defeated a motion for summary judgment. Goradia v. Hahn Co., Ill N.M. 779,
782, 810 P.2d 798, 801 (N.M. 1991). Goradia'sfair-mind factfinder standard properly arose from Goradia because
that case was decided based on the non-moving party's failure to meet its burden following a successful prima facie
showing by the moving party. Id. See Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 46, 999 P.2d at 1071 (Alarid, J., specially
concurring). The procedural posture of Eoff, where the moving party failed even to make a prima facie showing,
precluded the Eoff court from deciding what standard would be applied to determine whether the non-moving party
had defeated summary judgment. Eoff v. Forrest, 109 N.M. 695, 701, 789 P.2d 1262, 1268 (N.M. 1990). The
Bartlett majority appeared to misstate the holding of Eoff on this point. See Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 17, 999
P.2d at 1065-66 ("The nonmoving party must merely show that 'one or more factual issues appear from the
materials submitted to the court in connection with the motion' are contested.") (quoting Eoff, 109 N.M. at 699, 789
P.2d at 1266).
165. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036,1 46,999 P.2d at 1071 (Alarid, J., specially concurring). See Eoff, 109 N.M.
at 703, 789 P.2d at 1270 (Ransom, J., specially concurring). The application of the substantive evidentiary burden
of proof at the summary judgment stage is, of course, a key element of the Celotex approach to summary judgment.
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by the New Mexico appellate courts to treat federal and state summary judgment
standards as interchangeable.' 66
B. Should New Mexico Adopt the FederalApproach to Summary Judgment?
After the Bartlett majority concluded that the Celotex approach to summary
judgment had not been previously adopted in New Mexico, the second issue
considered by the majority was whether it should be adopted. 167 Judge Alarid,
however, believed that the dispositive issue on appeal in Bartlett was whether New
Mexico already had adopted the federal summary judgment standard, "not whether
New Mexico's traditional standards represent[ed] the better approach." ' Because
it was not clear to Judge Alarid whether New Mexico previously had adopted the
Celotex approach to summary judgment, he suggested that the New Mexico
Supreme Court clarify
the issue and decide whether New Mexico should adopt the
169
Celotex approach.
1. The Bartlett Majority
The Bartlett majority presented three reasons why New Mexico should not adopt
the federal approach to summary judgment. First, the majority believed that the
Liberty Lobby holding "does not so much change the standard for summary
judgment proceedings, but merely creates confusion for trial courts when determining the proper basis for granting or denying summary judgment."' 70 The second
reason was that the federal approach to summary judgment could, in the majority's
estimation, turn summary judgment into a full-blown paper trial on the merits.' 7 '
The third reason was that there was no demonstrated need to discard New Mexico's
"traditional" approach to summary judgment for the potential problems associated
with a new summary judgment standard.'72
The Bartlett majority concluded that the federal summary judgment approach
offered no substantive benefits to the law of summary judgment in New Mexico.' 73
The majority hypothesized that the adoption of the federal approach would diminish
the role of the jury and thereby adversely affect the jury system in New Mexico.' 74
The Bartlett majority feared that trial courts would interpret the adoption of the
Celotex standard as providing them greater authority to grant summary judgment
motions and as inviting them to weigh evidence during summary judgment
proceedings.' 75 When trial court judges weigh the evidence during summary
judgment proceedings, argued the majority, they supplant the jury as trier of fact and
arbiter of the credibility of witnesses. 7 6 This would negatively impact the jury

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 1 41, 999 P.2d at 1070 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
Id. 1 25, 999 P.2d at 1067.
Id. 1 50, 999 P.2d at 1072 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
Id.
Id. 31,999 P.2d at 1068.
Id. 32, 999 P.2d at 1068-69.
Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 35, 999 P.2d at 1069.
Id.
Id. [ 38, 999 P.2d at 1070.

175. Id.

176. Id.
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system in New Mexico and, thus, the Bartlett majority
77concluded that the traditional
approach to summary judgment should be retained. 1
2. The Bartlett Special Concurrence
Judge Alarid did not directly address the issue of whether New Mexico should
adopt the Celotex approach to summary judgment because he believed that the
dispositive issue on appeal in Bartlett was limited to whether New Mexico previously had adopted the federal summary judgment standard. 178 Having determined
that it was not clear whether New Mexico already had adopted the Celotex approach,
Judge Alarid believed that consideration of whether New Mexico should adopt the
federal summary judgment standard was beyond the authority of the court of appeals
because adoption of the Celotex approach to summary judgment would be "tantamount to substantially rewriting Rule 1-056."' 9 Judge Alarid therefore suggested
that the New Mexico Supreme Court clarify the issue and decide whether New
Mexico should adopt the Celotex approach.'
Though he avoided consideration of the issue of whether New Mexico should
adopt the Celotex approach to summary judgment, Judge Alarid examined two ways
in which New Mexico summary judgment procedure might be affected were the
federal standard to be adopted.' 8 ' First, Judge Alarid argued that express adoption
of the federal summary judgment standard in New Mexico would eliminate any
future confusion regarding whether the test for deciding a motion for summary
82
judgment is identical to the test for deciding a motion for directed verdict.
Second, Judge Alarid argued that adoption of the federal summary judgment
standard would establish summary judgment in the New Mexico courts as a useful
procedural tool for ensuring the speedy and just determination of litigation. 183 As he
noted in his special concurrence, "The point of summary judgment seems to me to
be to weed out those cases in which a party's case is so weak that no rational jury
could return a verdict in that party's favor." '"' The special concurrence reasoned that
there is no process that occurs between summary judgment and trial that would
likely transform inadequate evidence into a viable case. 185 Therefore, Judge Alarid
concluded that it would not warrant impaneling a jury if, after taking full advantage
of discovery and with the protection of Rule 1-056(f), which provides that a trial
court can grant continuances to the non-moving party to develop evidence to oppose
summary judgment, the evidence that a party had available were insufficient to
make its case at the summary judgment stage.' 86

177. Id. 1 39, 999 P.2d at 1070.
178. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 1 50, 999 P.2d at 1072 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
179. Id. (citing Tafoya v. S & S Plumbing Co., 97 N.M. 249, 252, 638 P.2d 1094, 1097 (N.M. Ct. App.
1981)).
180. Id.

181. Id. 47, 999 P.2d at 1071 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
182. Id.
183.

Id.

184. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 48, 999 P.2d at 1072 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
185. Id.
186. Id. Judge Alarid noted with approval that the Celotex approach to summary judgment took this reasoning
into account by giving content to the term "genuine issue" by relating that term directly to the non-moving party's
burden at trial. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
The following is an analysis of the Bartlett decision in terms of how the court
ruled with respect to each of the four Celotex summary judgment principles. The
goal of this analysis is to develop the contours of summary judgment in New
Mexico in relation to the federal standard.
A. New Mexico Rejects the FirstCelotex Principle
The first of the four Celotex summary judgment principles is that the substantive
evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits applies at the
summary judgment stage."s7 The Bartlett decision expressly rejected this principle
for New Mexico on three separate grounds. 8'
First, the Bartlettmajority read Eofffor the proposition that the non-moving party
in a summary judgment proceeding need not present evidence sufficient to meet the
burden of proof that would be required at trial, but "need only show a genuine issue
of material fact."' 89 The Bartlettcourt concluded that Eoffcompelled its holding that
the non-moving party, at the summary judgment stage, need not present evidence
sufficient to meet the burden at trial, as would be required under the Liberty Lobby
approach.'9 0
The Bartlett majority, however, appeared to misstate the holding of Eoff in
reaching this conclusion.' 9' Eoff illustrated the case where summary judgment was
denied because the moving party had failed to make a prima facie showing that no
genuine issue of material fact existed. 92 The motion for summary judgment did not
get off the ground in Eoff because the moving party failed to make its prima facie
showing.' 93 The Eoff court consequently never reached the issue of what was
required for the non-moving party to defeat a motion for summary judgment:
The movants, in other words, did not make a prima facie showing that there was
no genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the requisite elements in the heirs'
claim for fraud. That being the case, there was no occasionfor the district court
to consider,and we do not consider,whetheranything submittedon behalfof the
heirs rebutted a prima facie showing which the movants did not make. 94

The Bartlett majority cited Eofffor the proposition that "[t]he nonmoving party must
merely show that 'one or more factual issues appear from the materials submitted
to the court in connection with the motion' are contested," despite the fact that Eoff
never reached the issue of what a non-moving party must do to defeat summary
judgment.19 5 The Bartlett "need only show a genuine issue of fact" test would
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Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 1 7, 999 P.2d at 1064.
Id. (quoting Eoff v. Forrest, 109 N.M. 695, 701, 789 P.2d 1262, 1268 (N.M. 1990)).
Id.
See supra note 164.
See Eoff, 109 N.M. at 701, 789 P.2d at 1268.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 17, 999 P.2d at 1065-66 (quoting Eoff, 109 N.M. at 699, 789 P.2d at
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properly arise in a case where the moving party had successfully made a prima facie
showing, but summary judgment was denied because the non-moving party
subsequently rebutted that showing
with additional evidence that gave rise to a
96
genuine issue of material fact.1
The second ground upon which the Bartlett court rejected the first Celotex
principle was that the application of the first principle would require the trial judge
to weigh the evidence.197 The Liberty Lobby approach, according to the Bartlett
majority, requires the trial judge to look at the possibility of whether the evidence
could meet the substantive evidentiary standard at trial, which in turn requires the
court to weigh the evidence in light of that standard. 198 This is the result of a
contradiction the Bartlett majority perceived in the Liberty Lobby approach to
summary judgment.'99 Specifically, the Bartlett court found a contradiction in the
fact that, under Liberty Lobby, it is not the function of the trial court to weigh the
evidence, yet it is the trial court's function to determine the weight the jury may give
to a particular piece of evidence. 20 The Bartlett court concluded that "[it is clearly
necessary, in determining what standard is met, to weigh the evidence. ' 20' The
Bartlett court found this weighing impermissible because it would be an encroachment on the role of the jury as the trier of fact.20 2
The third reason was that the principle would create confusion for trial courts in
the process of deciding the proper basis for granting or denying summary
judgment. 2 3 Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist made this precise point in his dissent
to Liberty Lobby. He argued that one potential drawback to the principle that the
substantive evidentiary burden applied at the summary judgment stage was that the
burden was likely to be difficult to apply because it relied on a standard that more
closely reflected a state of mind than an analytical or logical approach. 2° In his
dissent to Liberty Lobby, Justice Rehnquist thus argued that the Court's decision to
graft the standard of evidentiary proof onto the law governing summary judgment
would be a source of confusion.2 5 Justice Rehnquist, applying the wisdom of Judge
Learned Hand, noted that the difference between the burdens of proof tended to be
vague and impressionistic, and, therefore, "'[w]hile at times it may be practicable'
to 'distinguish between the evidence which should satisfy reasonable men, and the
evidence which should satisfy reasonable men beyond a reasonable doubt[,]... in the
long run the line between them is too thin for day to day use. ' '206 Therefore,
according to Justice Rehnquist and the Bartlett majority, the consequence of
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As Judge Alarid noted in his special concurrence to Bartlett, Goradia represented just such a case. See
164.
Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 1 29, 999 P.2d at 1068.
Id.
Id. 32, 999 P.2d at 1069.
Id.

201. Id.

202. Id. 38, 999 P.2d at 1070.
203. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 31, 999 P.2d at 1068.
204. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 272 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
205. See id.
206. Id. at 271 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2nd Cir.
1944) (Hand, J.), overruled by United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 242-43 (2nd Cir. 1972)) (alteration in
original).
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applying a heightened standard of evidentiary proof at the summary judgment stage
is confusion in the lower courts, because the Liberty Lobby opinion affords "no
guidance whatsoever as to what, if any, difference the abstract standards that it
propounds would make in a particular case."2o 7
The Bartlett court ultimately rejected the first Celotex principle in favor of the
party must
"traditional" approach to summary judgment, in which the2 non-moving
8
0
contested.
are
issues
factual
more
or
one
that
show
merely
B. New Mexico Rejects the Second Celotex Principle
The Bartlett court rejected the principle that the test for summary judgment
mirrors the test for directed verdict.2 9 Bartlett did so on the ground that the New
Mexico Supreme Court considered the issue in Eoffand clearly distinguished the test
for summary judgment from the test for directed verdict. 2 0 According to the Bartlett
majority, Eoff announced a standard for summary judgment that did not test the
sufficiency of the evidence but rather inquired whether one or more factual issues
were disputed. 2t ' The purported basis for this test was Eoff s holding that the
sufficiency of the evidence can be tested only at trial on a motion for directed
verdict or by the jury.2" 2 Evidently ruling on stare decisis grounds, the Bartlettcourt
thus rejected the second Celotex principle that the test for summary judgment
mirrors the test for directed verdict."'3
The Bartlett court's ruling on this issue is law in New Mexico. Nonetheless,
Judge Alarid made a convincing case, in his special concurrence to Bartlett, that the
Goradiadecision adopted a test for summary judgment that was essentially the same
as the test for directed verdict. 4 Goradia gave two formulations of the test for
summary judgment. The first was that summary judgment must be granted if, from
the facts presented, but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn. 215 The second
formulation of the test was the following: if a fair minded factfinder, on the facts
presented in the motion for summary judgment, could return a verdict for the non26
moving party, the judge is required to deny the motion for summary judgment.
judgment
summary
The special concurrence likened the fair-minded factfinder
test in Goradiato the directed verdict test of Eoff, which stated that a motion for
directed verdict must be denied where sufficient evidence has been introduced to
allow a reasonable juror to find in the non-moving party's favor. 7 Judge Alarid
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Bartlett v. Mirabal, 2000-NMCA-036, 1 17, 999 P.2d 1062, 1065-66.
Id. 17, 999 P.2d at 1064.
Id. (citing Eoff v. Forrest, 109 N.M. 695, 701, 789 P.2d 1262, 1268 (N.M. 1990)).
Id. 7,999P.2dat 1064.
Eoff, 109 N.M. at 701, 789 P.2d at 1268. See id. at 702, 789 P.2d at 1269 (Ransom, J., specially con-

curring).
213. Id.
214. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 146, 999 P.2d at 1071 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
215. Id. See Goradia v. Hahn Co., I1 I N.M. 779, 782, 810 P.2d 798, 801 (N.M. 1991) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).
216. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 146, 999 P.2d at 1071 (Alarid, J., specially concurring). See Goradia, Ill
N.M. at 782, 810 P.2d at 801 (citing Chen v. Metro. Ins. & Annuity Co., 907 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1990)).
217. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 46, 999 P.2d at 1071 (Alarid, J., specially concurring) (citing Eoff, 109
N.M. at 702, 789 P.2d at 1269 (Ransom, J., specially concurring)). See also Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 106 N.M. 726, 728-29, 749 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (N.M. 1988) (stating the test for directed verdict in New
Mexico).
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concluded, in his special concurrence to Bartlett, that the summary judgment test of
Goradia mirrored New Mexico's test for directed verdict and, therefore, that New
Mexico, by equating the two tests, had effectively adopted the second Celotex
principle.'
C. New Mexico Likely Applies the Third Celotex Principle
The third summary judgment principle establishes the requirements for making
a prima facie showing and articulates the structure of the burden shifting that takes
place following that showing. 2 9 Though the Bartlett decision categorically rejected
the Celotex approach to summary judgment, the decision in Blauwkamp v.
University of New Mexico Hospital220 suggested that the third Celotex principle
likely applies to summary judgment in New Mexico.
Blauwkamp involved a medical malpractice action in which the defendants sought
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not prove an essential
element of their claim. 22 ! Specifically, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs
lacked an expert medical witness, which is a required element of a medical
malpractice claim in New Mexico. 222 A comparison of the summary judgment
structure adopted in Blauwkamp with the summary judgment structure articulated
by the third principle reveals a remarkable similarity.
The summary judgment structure adopted in Blauwkamp is identical in three
significant respects to the structure articulated by the third Celotex principle. First,
Blauwkamp required that the party moving for summary judgment carry an initial
burden of production and make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary
judgment. 223 The third Celotex principle has an identical requirement. 224 Second,
Blauwkamp recognized that a party moving for summary judgment can make its
prima facie showing by demonstrating to the court that the non-moving party's
evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the non-moving party's
claim. 225 The Blauwkamp court cited directly to the Celotex decision for this
approach to making a prima facie showing. 226 Third, Blauwkamp established a
burden shifting structure that was identical to the burden shifting structure
articulated by the third Celotex principle. Under the summary judgment structure
established in Blauwkamp, if the moving party succeeded in making a prima facie
showing of entitlement to summary judgment, the burden of proving the existence
of genuine material factual issues shifted to the non-moving party. 227 Blauwkamp
required the non-moving party to come forward and present, by affidavits or other
means, admissible evidence indicating material facts tending to establish each

218. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 46, 999 P.2d at 1071 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
219. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 329-37 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (articulating the third
federal summary judgment principle).
220. 114 N.M. 228, 836 P.2d 1249 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
221. Blauwkamp, 114 N.M. at 232, 836 P.2d at 1253.
222. Id. at 231-32, 836 P.2d at 1252-53.
223. Id. at 231, 836 P.2d at 1252.
224. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225. Blauwkamp, 114 N.M. at 232, 836 P.2d at 1253.
226. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
227. Id.
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required element of its claim. 22 1 Compare the burden shifting structure of the
Blauwkamp decision just described with the burden shifting structure articulated by
the third Celotex principle:
The burden of production imposed by Rule 56 requires the moving party to
make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment... [An
affirmative showing shifts the burden of production to the party opposing the
motion and requires that party either to produce evidentiary materials that
demonstrate the existence of a "genuine issue" for trial or to submit an affidavit
requesting additional time for discovery.229
Thus, Blauwkamp established a burden shifting structure that is identical to the
burden shifting structure articulated by the third Celotex principle.
The remarkable degree of similarity between the structure of summary judgment
in Blauwkamp and that articulated by the third Celotex principle suggests that the
third principle likely applies to summary judgment in New Mexico. On the other
hand, the Blauwkamp court reasoned that, on the facts of that particular case,
"Celotex and existing New Mexico cases produce the same result."23 Fortunately,
the Bartlett decision provided some insight on the issue. In its discussion of the
general law of summary judgment in New Mexico, the Bartlett majority found that
New Mexico law placed the initial burden of production on the moving party to
make a prima facie showing that there was no genuine issue of fact as to one or
more of the requisite elements of the non-moving party's claim.2 3' The Bartlettcourt
also found that, following a successful prima facie showing by the moving party, the
32
non-moving party needed to show that one or more factual issues were in dispute.2
Blauwkamp, Bartlett, and the third Celotex principle are in complete agreement
in two of three significant respects: all require a prima facie showing and all share
an identical burden shifting structure. To this extent, the third Celotex principle is
likely law in New Mexico. Unfortunately, there is no textual support in the Bartlett
decision for the proposition that a party moving for summary judgment can make
its prima facie showing by pointing out the insufficiency of the non-moving party's
evidence on any one essential element of the non-moving party's claim or defense.
In fact, the finding of the Bartlettcourt that the non-moving party need not convince
the trial court that it has evidence to support all the elements of its case seems to
23
contradict that propositionY.
Therefore, though the Blauwkamp decision suggested
that the moving party can make its prima facie showing by pointing out the
insufficiency of the non-moving party's evidence, it is uncertain whether this
reflected New Mexico's tacit adoption of the third Celotex principle or whether
Celotex and New Mexico cases merely produced the same result on the facts of
Blauwkamp.
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232.
233.

Id.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Blauwkamp, 114 N.M. at 232, 836 P.2d at 1253.
Bartlett v. Mirabal, 2000-NMCA-036, 1 17, 999 P.2d 1062, 1065.
Id.
Id. 17, 999 P.2d at 1066.
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D. New Mexico Rejects the Fourth Celotex Principle
The fourth principle is that summary judgment procedure is not a disfavored
shortcut but rather an integral part of the Federal Rules.234 Summary judgment in
New Mexico, following Bartlett, is a disfavored procedural shortcut. The Bartlett
court declined to adopt the fourth Celotex principle based on two policy considerations. The first was that adoption of the federal standard would create confusion in
the New Mexico trial courts. 235 The second reason was that adoption of the Celotex
approach would enhance judicial power at the expense of jury power.236
First, the Bartlett court rejected the fourth principle because it believed that
expanding the applicability of summary judgment would create confusion in the
New Mexico state trial courts.23 7 The court based this policy consideration on its
belief that there was an inherent contradiction in the Celotex approach regarding the
role of the judge in the summary judgment process. 238 The Celotex approach
admonishes judges not to weigh the evidence,239 yet it is the trial judge's function
in the summary judgment proceeding to determine the weight a jury may give a
particular piece of evidence.24 The Bartlett court argued that this contradiction
would create confusion regarding the trial judge's role, the consequence of which
would be that trial judges would interpret the adoption of the Celotex approach as
an invitation to grant summary judgment motions with greater frequency, as well as
to weigh the evidence during the summary judgment determination.24'
The Bartlett court's second policy consideration for rejecting the fourth Celotex
principle and declining to expand the applicability of summary judgment was that
increasing the availability of summary judgment as an instrument to control the
volume of litigation would adversely impact the jury system in New Mexico by
infringing on the jury's function as the trier of fact. 242 The Bartlett court reasoned
that, though the role of trial courts as gatekeepers has benefited the judicial process
in New Mexico, there exist limits to the trial court's authority to prevent a case from
being considered by a jury.243 Summary judgment tests the outer limit of the judge's
authority and the Bartlett court therefore rejected the fourth Celotex principle in

234. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1; 11 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29.
235. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 37, 999 P.2d at 1069.
236. Id. 38, 999 P.2d at 1070.
237. Id. 37, 999 P.2d at 1069.
238. Id. 1 32, 999 P.2d at 1069.
239. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).
240. Id. (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251).
241. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 937, 999 P.2d at 1069. One approach to summary judgment procedure that
would address the difficulties of applying the substantive evidentiary burden at the summary judgment stage is
suggested by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Liberty Lobby. Under Justice Brennan's approach, a non-moving
party could defeat summary judgment by presenting evidence to support all of the elements of the non-moving
party's legal claim. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 268 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This evidence could support the claim
directly or by an inference permitted by the substantive law of the underlying claim. Id. If the non-moving party
were to present such evidence to support all of the elements of its cause of action, the moving party's motion for
summary judgment must fail regardless of the burden of proof that the non-moving party must meet at the trial on
the merits. Id.
242. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 38, 999 P.2d at 1070.
243. See id.
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order to safeguard the role of the jury as the trier of fact and the true arbiter of the
credibility of witnesses.2
Based upon its two policy considerations, the Bartlett court reasoned that it did
not want to discard what previously had been a reliable method of applying the
summary judgment rules "in exchange for the uncertainty and the potentially chaotic
' Having found no persuasive rationale
universe of the federal rule."245
supporting a
change in New Mexico's approach to summary judgment, and in light of the
potential negative policy implications of expanding the use of summary judgment,
the Bartlett court consequently rejected the fourth Celotex principle.246
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. DiminishedPower of Trial Judges to Weed Out Factually Insufficient Claims
The Bartlett majority suggested that its decision to reject the Celotex approach
to summary judgment was meant to safeguard the jury's role as the ultimate trier of
fact.247 The Bartlett majority reasoned that requiring trial courts to apply the
substantive evidentiary burden of proof at trial "would adversely impact our jury
' This rationale
system and infringe on the jury's function as the trier of fact."248
overlooks the fact that a directed verdict can also terminate a claim before it goes to
the jury. 249 This fact is especially significant because New Mexico courts apply the
substantive burden of proof at the directed verdict stage. 5 Therefore, under the
Bartlett decision, the termination of factually insufficient claims will be delayed
until the directed verdict stage, in the process burdening the judicial system by
needlessly empanelling juries and conducting trials for claims that will never reach
the jury.

244. Compare id. with Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
245. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 36, 999 P.2d at 1069.
246. See id. 35-39, 999 P.2d at 1069-70.
247. Enhancing jury power can be considered beneficial because, as Justice Black noted in his dissent in
Galloway v. United States, the nation's founders believed that trial of fact by juries, rather than by judges, was an
essential bulwark of civil liberty. 391 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). Enhancing the power of the jury
at the expense of the judge, however, creates a number of difficulties for the legal system. Enhancing the power of
the jury by disfavoring summary judgment practice diminishes the power of the trial judges to manage
overburdened dockets. See 11 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29.
History also suggests that jury power is often subject to abuse. The anecdotal example of this is the
runaway jury that awards outrageous damages. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 439 (2001) ("[lI]t is clear that juries do not normally engage in such a finely tuned exercise of deterrence
calibration when awarding punitive damages."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (finding
grossly excessive award transcended the constitutional limit). In Cooper, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this
issue and diminished the role of the jury as finder of fact in determinations of punitive damages. Cooper Indus., 532
U.S. at 437. The Court held that the jury's determination of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of fact,
and, therefore, a federal appellate court can review an award of punitive damages without implicating the Seventh
Amendment. Id.
248. See Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 38, 999 P.2d at 1070.
249. The difference is that summary judgment tests the sufficiency of the non-moving party's discovery and
proposed evidence, whereas a directed verdict tests the quality of evidence actually presented at trial in support of
the non-moving party's claim. Compare Rule 1-056 NMRA 2003 and FED. R. Civ. P. 56 with Rule 1-050 NMRA
2003 and FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
250. Chavez v. Manville Prod. Corp., 108 N.M. 643, 648, 777 P.2d 371, 376 (N.M. 1989).
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Judge Alarid, in his special concurrence to Bartlett, reasoned that there is no
process that occurs between the summary judgment stage and the time when a jury
is empanelled for a trial that would likely transform what is inadequate evidence into
a viable case. 251' The Bartlett standard allows for a jury to be empanelled and a trial
to be conducted, even though a factually insufficient claim will likely not survive
a motion for directed verdict and thus not even be decided by a jury.252 Under these
circumstances, the Bartlett decision achieves neither the aim of judicial efficiency
mandated by the Rules of Civil Procedure nor the aim of the Bartlett majority to
safeguard the role of the jury as trier of fact. The Celotex approach, however,
factually
assigns a greater role to the judge by empowering the trial judge to isolate
253
jury.
a
before
going
from
claims
these
prevent
and
claims
insufficient
Consequently, rather than allocating greater power to the jury, the Bartlett
decision diminishes the power of the trial judge to weed out those cases where the
evidence is so weak that no rational jury could return a verdict in the non-moving
party's favor.254
B. Asymmetric Summary Judgment Standards in New Mexico
A second implication of the Bartlett decision is that it has engendered an
asymmetry in the standards applied by state and federal courts in New Mexico in
summary judgment proceedings. In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment
under Bartlett, a plaintiff must merely show that one or more factual issues are
contested from the materials submitted to the court in connection with the motion. 255
Furthermore, under Bartlett, the non-moving party need not convince the trial court
that he has evidence to support all the elements of his case, for256"it is enough if the
materials are 'sufficient to give rise to several issues of fact."'
In contrast, a plaintiff in federal court in New Mexico defending against a motion
for summary judgment under the Celotex approach must meet an exacting standard
in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff
must come forward with evidence supporting his case that would be sufficient for
a jury to return a verdict for him under the applicable evidentiary standard of
proof.257 The burden in cases requiring clear and convincing proof will obviously
be greater than those where the plaintiff must meet only the preponderance of the
evidence standard. Regardless of the burden of proof, however, the evidence
presented by the plaintiff to contest summary judgment will be measured in terms
of the quantum and quality of proof that the standard requires.25 This is a far cry
from the Bartlett standard, which requires only that one or more factual issues be

251. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 148, 999 P.2d at 1072 (Alarid, J., specially concurring).
252. Id. at 1065-66 ("The nonmoving party must merely show that 'one or more factual issues appear from
the materials submitted to the court in connection with the motion' are contested.").
253. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); 1I MOORE ET AL., supra note 29 (arguing that
the Celotex trilogy made summary judgment more readily available in the federal courts and thus established a
doctrine favoring the use of summary judgment as a method of controlling overburdened dockets).
specially concurring).
254. See Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 148, 999 P.2d at 1072 (Alarid, J.,
255. Id. 17, 999 P.2d at 1065-66.
256. Id. (quoting Eoffv. Forrest, 109 N.M. 695,700, 789 P.2d 1262, 1267 (N.M. 1990)).
257. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
258. id. at 254.
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contested. Adding to the plaintiff s summary judgment woes in federal court is the
Celotex requirement that the plaintiff present evidence on each essential element of
his claim, because a complete failure of proof concerning one essential element of
his claim necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 9
Given the opportunity to pursue the same claim in state and federal court, a
plaintiff in New Mexico will likely improve his chances of proceeding beyond the
summary judgment stage of litigation if he chooses a state forum over a federal
forum. Conversely, given the opportunity to remove a case from a New Mexico state
court to federal court, 260 a defendant would likely find federal court a more favorable
forum in which to use a motion for summary judgment to terminate factually
insufficient claims or defenses before they can go to trial and needlessly tax public
and private resources.261
The asymmetry between summary judgment procedure in state and federal court
is particularly apparent when a case requires proof by clear and convincing evidence.262 Some examples of claims requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence
are fraud,263 defamation,&4 oral modification to a written contract, 265 constructive
trust, 266 and excessive damage caused through condemnation.2 67 Additional claims
existing under New Mexico law that are not likely available for removal to federal
court because of their special relationship to state law include termination of parental rights, 6 ' reinstatement into the practice of law,26 prescriptive
easement,270 undue
27 ' mental incompetency,272 invalidity of marriage
27
influence in a will contest,
reformation of a deed,274 and adverse possession. 5

259. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
260. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (actions removable generally). One limitation on forum selection is that, in
diversity cases, the action may be removed only if no defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action is
pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
261. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
262. Claims requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence are the exception rather than the rule in New
Mexico:
It is the general rule, not only in New Mexico, but elsewhere, that issues of fact in civil cases are
to be determined according to the preponderance of the evidence.... [T]he requirement of clear
and convincing proof to sustain an issue claimed is the exception rather than the rule. We are not
disposed to enlarge the areas of the exception's application.
United Nuclear Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 480, 485, 709 P.2d 649, 654 (N.M. 1985).
263. Golden Cone Concepts, Inc. v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd., 113 N.M. 9, 14, 820 P.2d 1323, 1328 (N.M.
1991).
264. Furgason v. Clausen, 109 N.M. 331, 337-39, 785 P.2d 242, 248-50 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
in a defamation action a plaintiff who is a public figure must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant acted with actual malice). See UJI 13-1009 NMRA 2003.
265. Powers v. Miller, 1999-NMCA-080, 12, 984 P.2d 177, 180.
266. Homes by Marilynn v. Robinson, 111 N.M. 517, 519, 807 P.2d 215, 217 (N.M. 1991).
267. North v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 101 N.M. 222, 230, 680 P.2d 603, 611 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
268. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Amy B., 2003-NMCA-017, v 10-12, 61 P.3d 845,
848-49.
269. In re Quintana, 2001-NMSC-021, 28, 29 P.3d 527, 532.
270. Cox v. Hanlen, 1998-NMCA-015, 30, 953 P.2d 294, 302.
271. Gersbach v. Warren, 1998-NMSC-013, 9, 960 P.2d 811, 814. Undue influence in a will contest is, of
course, the underlying cause of action in the Bartlett case. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 1 3, 999 P.2d at 1063.
272. Heights Realty, Ltd. v. Phillips, 106 N.M. 692, 693, 749 P.2d 77, 78 (N.M. 1988); Gerety v. Demers,
92 N.M. 396, 405, 589 P.2d 180, 189 (N.M. 1978).
273. Allen v. Allen, 98 N.M. 652, 654, 651 P.2d 1296, 1298 (N.M. 1982).
274. Pacheco v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 37, 43, 636 P.2d 308, 314 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
275. Birtrong v. Coronado Bldg. Corp., 90 N.M. 670, 672, 568 P.2d 196, 198 (N.M. 1977).
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A hypothetical action involving a claim for defamation provides a useful example
of the asymmetry between summary judgment procedures in state and federal court.
First, assume that the defamation action was brought in state court in New Mexico.
In order to sustain a claim for defamation, New Mexico law requires that the
plaintiff prove the defendant negligently published the communication and
negligently failed to check on the truth or falsity of the communication prior to
publication.276 Where the claim for defamation involves a public figure, New
Mexico law further requires that a plaintiff prove that the defendant acted with
actual malice, 2" which must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.278
Assume that the New Mexico trial court, as a matter of law, has determined that
the person who was allegedly defamed is a public figure. 27 9 Also assume that the
defendant in the case successfully makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to
summary judgment. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to defend against the
motion. All the plaintiff need do in order to defeat summary judgment, under the
Bartlett standard, is convince the trial court that one or more factual issues appear,
from the materials submitted to the court, to be contested. 280 The state court need not
take into account whether the plaintiff's evidence is of sufficient caliber or quantity
to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence.28'
Compare the above hypothetical with the case where, other things being equal,
the defendant has successfully removed the defamation action to the federal district
court for the district of New Mexico on diversity grounds.282 The federal district
court will apply New Mexico defamation law to the action under the holding of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which requires federal courts to apply state substantive
law and federal procedural law in diversity cases.283 Under Erie, the hypothetical
plaintiff must now defend against summary judgment under the stringent demands
of the federal approach to summary judgment procedure articulated in the Celotex
trilogy. Now assume that the defendant has made his prima facie showing of
entitlement to summary judgment. In order to successfully defend against summary
judgment under the Celotex approach, the plaintiff must present evidence to the trial
court sufficient for a jury to reasonably find with "convincing clarity" that the
defendant acted with actual malice in making the defamatory statement, 284 as well

276. See UJI 13-1009 NMRA 2003; Furgason v. Clausen, 109 N.M. 331, 339, 785 P.2d 242, 250 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1989).
277. Furgason, 109 N.M. at 337, 785 P.2d at 248.
278. Id. See UJI 13-1009 NMRA 2003.
279. See Furgason, 109 N.M. at 337, 785 P.2d at 248 (citing Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d
462 (N.M. 1982)) ("Determination of whether or not a person is a public figure is relevant in determining the
required standard of proof, and the status of an individual as either a public figure, public official, or private person
constitutes a question of law to be determined by the court.") (emphasis added).
280. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 17, 999 P.2d at 1065-66.
281. Compare id. with Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). But see Furgason, 109
N.M. at 339, 785 P.2d at 250 ("A motion for summary judgment in a defamation action necessarily involves
determination of the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.").
282. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
283. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
284. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
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as show, as to every other element of the defamation action, that he has sufficient
evidence to allow a jury to find for him.285
Therefore, one implication of the Bartlett decision is that it has engendered an
asymmetry in the standards applied by state and federal courts in New Mexico in
summary judgment proceedings.286 A plaintiff in federal court in New Mexico is
287
subjected to a veritable paper trial on the merits at the summary judgment stage;
whereas, a plaintiff in New Mexico state court is able 'to proceed beyond that stage
merely by showing the existence of one or more issues of material fact in dispute.288
C. Two Areas of Uncertainty Regarding the New Mexico Summary Judgment
Standard
The ease with which a non-moving party can defeat summary judgment under the
Bartlett standard suggests a hostility to summary judgment practice that is not
evident in earlier New Mexico decisions. In fact, two aspects of the Bartlettholding
regarding the test for defeating summary judgment appear to contradict New Mexico
precedent.
First, the requirement that the non-moving party need only show the existence of
one or more factual issues in dispute is not in accord with the holding of the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Goodman v. Brock. 289 The Goodman court expressly
rejected the standard that allowed summary judgment to be denied where there is the
"slightest doubt" as to the facts, adopting instead a standard that requires
"reasonable doubt" regarding a substantial dispute as to the material facts. 290

285. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
286. Despite this apparent asymmetry, a plaintiff who has pursued a claim in federal court and had that claim
dismissed by an order granting summary judgment could be barred, under Wolford, from subsequently bringing a
similar claim in a New Mexico state court. See Wolford v. Lasater, 1999-NMCA-024, 16, 973 P.2d 866, 871. In
Wolford, a New Mexico state court gave preclusive effect to a federal court order that granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs state court claims. See id. In affirming the dismissal of the
state court claims, the Wolford court reasoned that "the federal and our own state's constructions of summary
judgment do not differ substantively." Id. I 1 , 973 P.2d at 869. The Wolford decision thus suggests that an order
granting summary judgment on a claim in federal court is likely to preclude subsequently bringing different claims
raising common issues of fact in state court in New Mexico. See id.
287. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 266-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
288. Bartlett, 2000-NMCA-036, 17, 999 P.2d at 1065-66.
289. 83 N.M. 789, 498 P.2d 676 (N.M. 1972).
290. Prior to 1972, the general rule in New Mexico was that summary judgment was improper where there
was the "slightest doubt" as to whether factual issues existed. Bostian v. Aspen Wood Prod. Corp., 81 N.M. 152,
153, 464 P.2d 882, 883 (N.M. 1970). See also Ginn v. Macaluso, 62 N.M. 375, 378, 310 P.2d 1034, 1036 (N.M.
1957) ("Litigants are entitled to the right of trial where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts."). The New
Mexico Supreme Court, however, eventually rejected the "slightest doubt" test. Goodman v. Brock, 83 N.M. 789,
792,498 P.2d 676, 679 (N.M. 1972). The Goodman court reasoned that New Mexico appellate courts had departed
from the meaning and purpose of Rule 1-056(C) by equating the term "genuine issue as to any material fact" with
the term "slightest doubt." Id. The Goodman court thus established the rule that only "reasonable doubts," rather
than "slightest doubts," about the existence of a factual dispute could foreclose summary judgment. Id. The
"reasonable doubt" rule articulated in Goodman appears to state the current general rule. See, e.g., Koenig v. Perez,
104 N.M. 664, 666, 726 P.2d 341, 343 (N.M. 1986); Nat'l Adver. Co. v. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n, 91
N.M. 191, 194, 571 P.2d 1194, 1197 (N.M. 1977); Ambassador East Apts. Investors v. Ambassador East Invs., 106
N.M. 534, 537, 746 P.2d 163, 166 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). But cf. Pharmaseal Lab., Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 756,
568 P.2d 589, 592 (N.M. 1977) ("Summary judgment is a drastic remedy to be used with great caution."), affd in
part, rev'd in part, Pharmaseal Lab., Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589 (N.M. 1977).
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The second aspect of the Bartlettholding that appears to contradict New Mexico
precedent is that the non-moving party need not present evidence to support all the
essential elements of its case. 29' This contradicts the Blauwkamp court's recognition
that a party moving for summary judgment can make its prima facie showing by
demonstrating to the court that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to
establish an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.292 Whereas the
Bartlett court ruled that the non-moving party need not present evidence as to each
essential element of its claim, 293 the Blauwkamp court found that a failure of
evidence on a single element would provide grounds for summary judgment.294
Thus, the final implication of the Bartlett decision is that the standard for
defeating summary judgment in New Mexico is uncertain in at least two important
respects. First, the standard articulated by the Bartlett court is not in accord with
New Mexico precedent regarding what is required of the non-moving party to defeat
summary judgment. Second, Bartlett appears to contradict the Blauwkamp
requirement that a non-moving party must present evidence to support all the
essential elements of its claim or defense.
VII. CONCLUSION
The standard governing summary judgment in New Mexico following Bartlett
v. Mirabalis fraught with uncertainty. The standard is uncertain by its very terms,
seeming to allow summary judgment to be denied where merely one factual issue
is in dispute. It is uncertain in its relationship to New Mexico precedent, from which
it appears to diverge in its outright hostility to summary judgment practice. Finally,
it is uncertain in its relationship to the Celotex summary judgment standard, at least
one principle of which Bartlett appears to endorse despite its remonstrance to the
contrary. Given the beneficial role that summary judgment can play in securing the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, it is a disservice to the
state for the New Mexico Supreme Court to remain idle while the lower courts fetter
summary judgment practice with the uncertainty of the Bartlett approach.
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